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The return of high levels of emigration has become one of the most debated and
sensitive social topics in Ireland in recent years. But Irish emigration continues to
be discussed in the singular rather than the plural. This paper compares Irish emi-
gration to other Eurozone states that also encountered serious economic difﬁculties
following the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis to highlight international trends
and specify national differences. All of the ‘PIIGS’ experienced increased emigra-
tion after the crisis. Yet Irish citizens left in much greater numbers per capita than
their Eurozone counterparts, with only Portugal bearing any similarities. This was
because Irish emigrants possessed valuable transnational human, cultural and social
capital that enabled them to access liberal labour markets outside the Eurozone.
They possessed skills desired by attractive destination states; they spoke the same
language and shared similar cultural traits as their hosts; and they were able to call
upon recently renewed Irish networks to further facilitate their move abroad.
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Emigration was not unique to Ireland. But the type of emigration, the scale of
emigration and the impact of emigration were. (Lee 1989)
[. . .]Irish exceptionalism has been too long an unexamined doctrine. Actually, much
of what happened in Ireland occurred elsewhere in Europe as well, and most of the
things that Irish migrants did were done by other Europeans also. (Akenson 2011)
The Irish migration experience has been studied mostly in the singular rather than
the plural. This is a pity because, as Brettell and Holliﬁeld (2000: 14) have sur-
mised, comparative works have provided some of the most ‘important and path-
breaking work on migration’ so far produced. Several historians have contrasted© Copyright Irish Journal of Sociology ISSN 0791-6035, EISSN 2050-5280, Vol. 23.2, 2015, pp. 93–113
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2008), but few have compared the Irish case with that of others. The limited
numbers of historical works that do exist tend to be conﬁned to examinations
of nineteenth and early twentieth century emigration (Hatton and Williamson
1998; Diner 2002; Akenson 2011; Glynn 2011; Belchem 2011), rather than
studies of more recent trends. In the post-war decades, Ireland was not the only
country to see large swathes of its population emigrate. Yet, scholars have in-
frequently attempted to place Ireland in a European perspective, with Delaney
(2000) offering a rare exception. It is important to note that this exclusivity is
not merely a trait of scholars examining Irish emigration. The literature on in-
ternational migration rarely includes Ireland or the Irish in analyses. Indeed,
Ryan (2013) has written of her frustration at ‘the lack of reference to Irish re-
search in studies of other migrant groups, when comparisons seem quite obvious’.
This paper seeks to go beyond the conﬁnes of analysing just one case by compar-
ing Irish emigration since 2008 to that of four other Western European countries.
Kocka (2003: 40) notes that ‘comparison does not only help to support notions of
particularity, but is also indispensable for challenging and modifying such no-
tions’. With this in mind, this paper seeks to determine whether Ireland was just
one of the ‘PIIGS’1 (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) or a European em-
igration outlier.
To help resolve such a puzzle, the context for why emigration increased in re-
cent years from all ﬁve countries will ﬁrst be set. Subsequently, the paper will
demonstrate that Irish emigration was substantially different in terms of its scale
and character when compared to Italian, Spanish, Greek, and, to a lesser extent,
Portuguese emigration. The main explanation advanced for this difference was
that Irish emigrants possessed valuable transnational human, cultural and social
capital that enabled them to move to English-speaking liberal labour markets that
came through the crisis more rapidly than Eurozone states. Transnational capital
is understood here to mean the ‘intercultural competence’ that allowed migrants
to ‘operate in different ﬁelds beyond the individual nation-state’ (Gerhards and
Hans 2013: 99–100). Human capital is ‘an individual’s labour power, skills,
training and abilities’ (Piketty 2014: 46). Cultural capital is more difﬁcult to
deﬁne. Bourdieu (1986) ﬁrst used the concept to ‘explain the unequal scholastic
achievement of children originating from the different social classes’. Several
authors have since applied Bourdieu’s theory to the difﬁculties encountered by
immigrants in their adopted homes. For instance, Bauder (2003: 699) argues that
‘the nonrecognition of foreign credentials amounts to the systematic exclusion of
immigrant workers from the upper segments of the labour market’. It is argued in
this paper, however, that Irish emigrants were able to bypass these types of
constraints and thereby ‘participate in locally-shared professional cultures’ (Erel
2010: 648) because their cultural capital resembled that of their host societies.
Social capital refers to the ability to beneﬁt from certain networks. Portes (1998: 7)
eloquently sums it up as follows: ‘Whereas economic capital is in people’s bank
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ture of their relationships. To possess social capital, a person must be related to
others, and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her
advantage’.
Irish emigrants’ skills, cultural background and social networks enabled them
to take full advantage of migration agreements with Australia, New Zealand and
Canada when the economic crisis hit. They were also able to proﬁt from the
improving economic situation in the UK. Their qualiﬁcations were recognised
because they spoke the same language and shared many cultural and historical
similarities with their hosts, which enabled Irish newcomers to avoid some of
the obvious boundaries protecting natives and compete with them in the labour
market on a relatively level playing ﬁeld. Prospective Greek, Portuguese, Spanish
or Italian migrants did not have the same options because migration agreements
between southern European states and these traditional settler-states remain in
their infancy. Although Portuguese, Spanish and Italian citizens shared cultural
ties with Latin America, that continent did not offer the same economic opportu-
nities as the English-speaking states targeted by Irish emigrants. Certain
Portuguese-speaking African countries undergoing enormous growth and expan-
sion, by contrast, did attract sizeable skilled Portuguese emigration. This partly
explains why the scale of Portuguese emigration corresponds most closely to
Irish emigration. Another potential explanation to further explain why citizens
from these two countries emigrated in greater numbers, explored in further detail
towards the end of the paper, is that Irish and Portuguese citizens could call upon
vibrant social networks of co-nationals, which had been revitalised in the years
preceding the crisis, to help them settle abroad.
It is important to note that this article focuses predominantly on the emigra-
tion of Irish, Portuguese, Italian, Greek and Spanish citizens rather than immi-
grants moving away from the ‘PIIGS’. The emigration of a country’s own
citizens is the main reason the topic has once again become an issue of public
and political concern in Ireland and elsewhere. Citizens usually have strong ties
with the communities and families they leave behind and the state has invested
signiﬁcantly in these people’s education. By contrast, when immigrants leave
the ‘PIIGS’ to return home or move on to another country it does not usually
provoke the same outcry from the public.Setting the context
The global ﬁnancial crisis, variously referred to by leading economists as the
‘Great Recession’ (Stiglitz 2010: xi) or the ‘Lesser Depression’ (Krugman 2011),
had an enormous impact on the Eurozone and Ireland after 2008. According to
Donovan and Murphy (2013: 255), ‘Few, if any industrial countries have suc-
cumbed so quickly and so sharply to a ﬁnancial crisis’ as Ireland. Real Irish GDP
fell by 3 per cent in 2008 and 7 per cent in 2009. The Irish banking system almost
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2010, Ireland’s budget deﬁcit rose to an incredible 31 per cent of GDP. As a con-
sequence of the state’s economic turmoil, the Irish debt to GDP ratio quadrupled
(Ibid.: 2). A national bailout from the ‘Troika’ (consisting of the IMF, the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Central Bank) followed in late 2011. In re-
sponse to the serious economic difﬁculties Ireland faced, the Irish government
took a number of austerity measures. It introduced a recruitment and promotion
moratorium for the civil service, local authorities, non-commercial state bodies,
the police and the defence forces (RTÉ 2009). A modiﬁed version applied to the
health and education sectors. The ensuing ‘Croke Park Agreement’ between the
unions and the state led to sizeable early retirements taking place and little or no
hiring of replacements. Civil servants in employment saw their wages decrease
signiﬁcantly.
Between 2007 and 2012, unemployment trebled, from under ﬁve per cent
to over ﬁfteen per cent. Youth unemployment also saw a marked increase.
During the same time period, national housing prices decreased by approxi-
mately ﬁfty per cent (Lyons 2015). Certain labour sectors felt the brunt of the
recession more profoundly than others. The demise of the construction indus-
try had a major impact on unemployment ﬁgures, particularly for males. The
amount of people working in the industry dropped from a peak of 380,000 to
approximately 150,000 by the end of 2011 (Society of Chartered Surveyors
Ireland 2012: 6). The crisis also caused a notable downturn in employment in
manufacturing and retail, as consumer spending decreased across Ireland and
its export markets. Rising unemployment, a distinct lack of job opportunities
for graduates and the recently unemployed, as well as reduced wages and lim-
ited openings for promotion for those with jobs resulted in a signiﬁcant rise in
emigration. Yet, Ireland was not the only Eurozone country faced with near
economic meltdown.
Greece preceded Ireland by entering into its ﬁrst bailout with the IMF and the
Eurozone countries in May 2010. A second bailout with the Troika followed less
than two years later. The Greek economy declined by an astounding twenty-three
per cent between 2007 and 2013. Matsaganis and Leventi (2014: 408), in a paper
comparing the effects of austerity and recession on Greece, Portugal, Italy and
Spain, concluded that Greece has felt the effects of the crisis most starkly, with
poverty and inequality rising to ‘alarming levels’. Portugal too required its own
bailouts from the Troika in May 2011. In a similar fashion to what occurred in
Ireland, taxes rose, while unemployment beneﬁt, family allowances, social assis-
tance and public sector wages decreased (Leahy, Healy and Murphy 2013: 33).
The Spanish case resembles what occurred in Ireland most closely. Between 1995
and 2007, the number of people employed in construction in Spain increased from
1.2 million to 2.8 million (Meardi, Martín and Riera 2012: 10). Replicating the
Irish experience, the economic crisis heralded the demise of the previously boom-
ing Spanish construction industry. A banking crisis followed. In contrast to
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months of 2012 alone, banks repossessed almost 100,000 properties whereas re-
possessions remained minimal in Ireland (Fuentes et al. 2013: 1198). The crisis
did not affect Italy as dramatically as the other ‘PIIGS’, partly because it had fol-
lowed many years of stagnation rather than any enormous growth. Neverthe-
less, the crisis added to the country’s woes. Following the rise of Spanish and
Italian bond yields to unsustainable levels in the summer of 2012, the European
Central Bank established its long-term reﬁnancing operation (LTRO) – unlike
the other countries, Italy and Spain were too big to bail out – and pledged to
purchase unlimited sovereign debt to ensure the survival of the Euro. The
Italian and Spanish governments instigated further austerity measures as a re-
sult, which bore many similarities to what happened in Ireland (e.g. cutbacks in
education and health expenditure, public sector salary reductions and limited
public recruitment). The most glaring evidence of the consequences of the crisis
manifested itself in national unemployment statistics.
Spanish and Greek unemployment more than trebled between 2007 and 2013,
from eight per cent to twenty-six per cent. Portuguese and Italian unemployment
rose substantially – but not quite as dramatically (see Figure 1).
Rocketing youth unemployment became an enormous problem in the ‘PIIGS’,
particularly in Spain and Greece, where over ﬁfty-ﬁve per cent of 15–24 year olds
in the labour force were without work by 2013. Considering the enormity of Span-
ish and Greek unemployment, especially when compared to Ireland’s, it might have
been expected that these countries experienced higher levels of emigration. Yet, the
reality proved quite different.0
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Figure 1 Unemployment in the ‘PIIGS’, 2007–14 (in per cent).
Source: Eurostat
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In response to the effects of the crisis, emigration from the ‘PIIGS’ re-emerged as
an issue in national debates. It is extremely important to remember that emigration
is not just a result of unemployment and underemployment. A recent analysis of
Irish emigration revealed that different people leave for divergent reasons. Almost
half of those emigrating possessed full-time jobs prior to their departure. A size-
able proportion of these people left because they wanted to travel and experience
other cultures. These were often people with qualiﬁcations that other countries
coveted, such as valuable IT skills or health professionals (Glynn, Kelly and Mac
Éinrí 2013: 38). Dissatisfaction with people’s career prospects caused others to
leave. Many emigrants reported being unhappy with their long-term career pros-
pects in Ireland before departure. Those in employment before emigrating (includ-
ing those working part-time), gave an average score of 5.5 out of 10 for their job
satisfaction in Ireland compared to 7.6 out of 10 for Irish emigrants’ job satisfac-
tion abroad – a notable improvement (Ibid.: 66). Certain people working in jobs
unrelated to their qualiﬁcations felt that going abroad might enable them to put
into practice the skills that they had acquired over the preceding years. Others felt
that they had few opportunities to develop their career at home due to the knock-
on effects of the crisis. People’s contract status also sometimes played a role.
Those with short-term and temporary contracts faced an uncertain future. Some
attempted to take back the initiative by emigrating.
For Irish people made redundant during the crisis, the prospects of ﬁnding
work again in such a depressed and competitive economic environment also
caused many to look overseas. Over one third of Irish emigrants were either un-
employed (twenty-three per cent) or underemployed (thirteen per cent) when
they left. Students who graduated in the years hardest hit by the recession strug-
gled to break into the job market. This was reﬂected in the fact that ﬁfteen per
cent of emigrants consisted of people who were previously students. Fewer
graduate positions presented themselves and various students who emigrated af-
ter completion of their courses cited the unfair rivalry that they often faced from
senior candidates when applying for junior positions. The state recruitment em-
bargo also meant that school and university graduates hoping to work as police
ofﬁcers or teachers, for example, had limited options in Ireland. Similarly, many
of those who aimed to work in the health sector, such as nurses, physiotherapists
and occupational therapists, had few employment possibilities following gradua-
tion. A small number of people emigrated for a range of personal reasons, such
as to join up with a partner based abroad or to study overseas.
The Irish Central Statistics Ofﬁce (CSO) produces annual migration ﬁgures that
provide a breakdown of the number of Irish people leaving and returning every
year, based on sex, age, education and destination/origin. They also produce statis-
tics for a range of other nationalities and regions (e.g. UK citizens, EU12 citizens).
Researchers studying Irish emigration are lucky to have such a valuable source of
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numbers and work permits granted to Irish citizens in various destinations, includ-
ing Australia, the United States, Canada and New Zealand. The data clearly show
that the number of Irish citizens leaving Ireland almost quadrupled between 2008
and 2013. In 2014, ﬁgures dropped somewhat – presumably as a result of more
positive economic news in Ireland – but the number of Irish people returning also
decreased, leaving one to wonder whether Irish emigrants are becoming more set-
tled abroad. Between 2010 and 2014, almost 210,000 Irish citizens emigrated
(CSO 2014). In the same time period, slightly over 85,000 returned, leaving a net
migration loss of over 120,000 citizens in ﬁve years (see Figure 2).
Unfortunately, it remains difﬁcult to compare the scale of outﬂow across the
ﬁve countries under consideration due to the lack of equivalent statistics avail-
able. Spanish and Italian ofﬁcial estimates are based on the amount of citizens
registering at foreign consulates. These statistics need to be treated with enor-
mous care, however, because not all Spaniards and Italians register their pres-
ence with consulates abroad, partly because they may lose certain health beneﬁts
in their country of origin by doing so. It is important to note that Spanish and
Italian estimates also contain sizeable proportions of people who were actually
born outside Spain and Italy but either gained citizenship after immigrating to
these countries or qualiﬁed for citizenship through their parents or grandparents.
This explains why over 10,000 Spanish citizens registered with Spanish consul-
ates in Ecuador in 2013, for instance. Most were born in Ecuador and migrated
to Spain in the late 1990s and 2000s, naturalised whilst there, and have since
returned home – often with their Spanish-born children (INE 2014: 11).0
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Figure 2 Migration of Irish citizens, 2008–14 (in 000s).
Source: CSO 2014
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category comprises ‘permanent’ emigrants who leave for over one year and
another category consists of ‘temporary’ emigrants who return within one year.
The Portuguese INE (2014) notes that in 2009, less than 15,000 Portuguese
citizens emigrated ‘permanently’. In 2013, the corresponding ﬁgure had risen
to over 50,000. Additionally, more than 70,000 Portuguese citizens emigrated
‘temporarily’ in 2013. This accounts for such movements as Portuguese
workers’ seasonal work in the Swiss tourist industry and temporary contracts
in Angola, but the other ‘PIIGS’ do not differentiate between emigrants in
this fashion, making it difﬁcult to compare Portuguese ﬁgures. An academic
research body, the Observatório da Emigração (2014: 36), has come up with
its own annual emigration estimates based on destination data. They are
slightly less than the combined temporary and permanent ﬁgures presented by
the national statistics body, presumably because some temporary migrants
can be counted by the state more than once if they fulﬁll several temporary
contracts abroad in one year.
As outlined above, there are various problems with national statistics. Con-
versely, at least these estimates exist. No national ofﬁcial migration data is avail-
able for Greece apart from some Eurostat estimates. The limited Eurostat available
does suggest that Greek emigration has increased considerably in recent years, but
there is no national data to support this. Instead, researchers have to rely on census
records that reveal the growth and decline of Greek citizens in different age co-
horts. Yet, these only occur every ten years, with the last having taken place in
May 2011.
Destination data can ﬁll some of the gaps in our knowledge but they cannot
provide a comprehensive picture because of a lack of consistency between states.
France, a major target of Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and Greek emigrants in the
post-war decades, for example, does not provide statistics comparable to some of
its neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, some approximate trends can be identi-
ﬁed from examining source statistics. Germany represents one of the most popular
EU destinations for current European emigrants because of the relatively healthy
state of its economy in recent years, especially when compared to other member
states. Annual Greek emigration to Germany increased from under 9000 in 2009
to over 34,000 in 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014: 19). Spanish migrants fol-
lowed a comparable trajectory, increasing from less than 10,000 in 2008 to over
36,000 by 2014. Similarly, less than 20,000 Italians arrived in 2009 but the num-
ber had almost trebled by 2013. Unlike the late 1980s and early 1990s, Irish emi-
gration to Germany has remained low in recent years, with English-speaking
destinations preferred. Italian, Spanish and Portuguese emigrants have also moved
to Switzerland, a non-EU country with particularly low unemployment rates. The
presence of sizeable Spanish and, in particular, Italian and Portuguese communi-
ties in Switzerland meant that more recent emigrants could call upon those already
in situ for assistance and advice.
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Figure 3 Acquisition of UK National Insurance Numbers by citizens from
‘PIIGS’, 2008–14.
Source: UK Department of Work and Pensions
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50,000 Spaniards, almost 45,000 Italians and more than 30,000 Portuguese ap-
plied for UK National Insurance numbers. For the Spanish ﬁgures, this repre-
sented a more than three-fold increase since 2009. The number of new Italian and
Portuguese arrivals seeking work in the UK also more than doubled during the
same period. Irish ﬁgures, by contrast, did not rise so markedly, with slightly over
18,000 arriving in 2014 compared to just over 11,000 in 2009. It is possible that
some Irish emigrants may already have held national insurance numbers from pre-
vious time spent in the UK.
An analysis of the above chart may cause readers to speculate that there is
nothing unique about Irish emigration. Yet, this masks a key feature of the cur-
rent outﬂow: the emigrant per capita data. Italy and Spain’s annual ﬁgures, al-
though seemingly large in gross terms, are extremely low when compared to the
size of their populations – almost 60 million and 47 million respectively. If the
estimates provided by national statistical bodies for emigration in 2013 are com-
pared, Ireland stands out amongst its Western European counterparts, particu-
larly when set against Italy and Spain (see Figure 4).
As noted earlier, there is a notable difference between ofﬁcial Spanish and
Italian emigration statistics and immigration ﬁgures provided by the UK and
German authorities. For instance, over 100,000 Italian nationals and almost
90,000 Spanish nationals moved to Germany and the UK in 2013 according to
destination statistics. Yet, the ofﬁcial Italian and Spanish estimates contend that
less approximately 24,000 and 13,000 of their citizens respectively moved to
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Figure 4 Gross emigration of Italian, Spanish, Greek, Portuguese and Irish
citizens per 1,000 in 2013. Calculations based on CSO 2014, Eurostat
(Table migr_emi1ctz), ISTAT 2014, INE 2014, INE Portugal 2014
(ﬁgures for ‘permanent’ emigration). *The light shaded part of the Portuguese
bar reﬂects ‘temporary’ migration, as speciﬁed in INE Portugal 2014.
Source: CSO 2014, Eurostat (Table migr_emi1ctz), ISTAT 2014, INE 2014
and INE Portugal 2014 data
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that real Spanish emigration may be three times the size of ofﬁcial estimates.
But even if Spanish and Italian emigration in 2013 is multiplied by three, it still
pales in comparison to the departure of Irish, Greek and Portuguese citizens. In-
terestingly, the vast majority of people leaving Spain and Italy today are actually
immigrants returning home or moving on to a third country. Large numbers of
immigrants have also exited Greece as a result of the deteriorating economic
conditions (OECD 2013: 256). Immigrants do feature in the emigration data in
Ireland or Portugal, but not as prominently. Instead, it is citizens who have dom-
inated recent outﬂows, particularly between 2011 and 2013 in Ireland’s case. As
occurred in the post-war emigration peaks (see ﬁgures contained in Münz 2007:
28), Ireland and Portugal have again experienced the greatest emigration per
capita out of all the ‘PIIGS’, despite not having experienced the same level of
unemployment as other states, such as Spain. Why is this? One key reason is
because of the destinations that they can access due to the capital they possess.
Transnational capital and desirable destinations
Ireland has endured serious economic problems since 2008, as have Portugal,
Italy, Greece and Spain. As a result, emigration has increased from all the ‘PIIGS’.
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only country that comes close to replicating Ireland is Portugal – and this depends
greatly on which statistics are used. The Irish could easily access the neighbouring
UK, the most popular destination for emigrants in previous waves of emigration
in the 1950s and 1980s (see Scully and Ryan in this issue), but they also had the
advantage of being able to look beyond the conﬁnes of the EU for potential desti-
nations. Indeed, the majority of Irish emigrants moved to non-EU countries, such
as Australia and, more recently, Canada, which recovered from the effects of the
crisis much quicker than European member states and consequently continued to
welcome large numbers of newcomers as part of their organised immigration in-
take schemes that had been in place for decades. Irish citizens were targeted by
these countries because of their valued transnational capital. Prospective Irish emi-
grants could enter Australia, New Zealand and Canada on working holiday migra-
tion schemes designed to attract young Irish citizens for one to two years.
Emigrants had to be between 18 and 30 years of age to enter the Australian and
New Zealand programmes, and between 18 and 35 for the Canada equivalent.
Many managed to extend their stay through long-term skilled migration schemes
because they had the qualiﬁcations and training that these countries desired. Their
integration was further accelerated by the fact that they shared important historic
and cultural links because British administration had featured so centrally in all of
their pasts. Indeed, that common past ensured they spoke the same language. Fur-
thermore, sizeable swathes of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand popula-
tion claimed Irish heritage due to historic emigration. Irish citizens were also able
to take advantage of the presence of extensive Irish networks in these destination
states, some of which had been replenished in the late 1990s and 2000s through
lifestyle migration (Benson and O’Reilly 2009).
Australia and Canada emerged from the global ﬁnancial crisis more rapidly
than EU member states, partly because of the natural minerals available to them
via their successful mining industries. The banking sectors in both countries also
came through the downturn relatively unscathed. Irish emigrants took full advan-
tage of the migrant schemes already in place between Ireland and Australia to
emigrate there after the onset of the crisis. The working holiday visa scheme be-
gan in 1975 with reciprocal agreements between Australia and the UK, Ireland
and Canada facilitating movement between the countries. Since the late 1990s,
spending a year in Australia on the working holiday visa programme had be-
come increasingly common for many young Irish people. This trend continued
throughout the boom and in 2004 Australia extended its working holiday visa to
two years for Irish citizens, provided they met certain conditions. Between 2002
and 2007, 11,000 to approximately 13,500 Irish travelled to Australia on the
working holiday scheme each year (Gilmartin 2013: 11). New Zealand had a
similar programme that accommodated young Irish people, although it did not
attract the same kind of numbers of Irish as its Australian equivalent (approxi-
mately 2,000 per year). The expansion of Canada’s working holiday visa
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Irish to move there on two-year visas in 2014.
Apart from Italy, the other ‘PIIGS’ did not have the same access to these non-
EU labour markets. Italy has shared a working holiday visa arrangement with
Australia, akin to the Irish agreement, since 2004. The number of Italians attaining
working holiday visas rose from less than 5000 in 2008/09 to over 16,000 in
2013/14 (Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2014). However,
in contrast to the Irish in Australia, only a small number of Italians transferred to
Australia’s skilled immigration programme during this period (as discussed further
below). Despite Australia representing a popular destination for Greek emigrants
in the post-war decades, the two countries only put in place a work and holiday
agreement in May 2014. This type of scheme differed from the one available to
young Irish and Italian citizens in that applicants had to speak functional English
and were required to have completed at least two years of university education
prior to arrival. Furthermore, the scheme lasted for one year only and could not be
extended for another year. Spain signed a similar agreement in September 2014.
Only 500 citizens from each state could beneﬁt from the agreement per year,
whereas no limits existed for Irish and Italian citizens.
An analogous story emerged for Canada. In 2015, the country offered 10,700
Irish citizens the opportunity to move across the Atlantic for two years under its
various migration programmes instigated for young Irish workers. Only 1000
places were available for Italian and Spanish citizens to work in Canada – for
one year instead of two. Greece fared even with worse, with only 200 places
offered.
Portugal has yet to forge any agreement with Australia or Canada. Yet Portu-
guese emigrants had access to other important labour markets. Angola and
Mozambique came through the crisis relatively unscathed, largely because of
their mineral wealth. Having experienced annual growth of approximately seven
to eight per cent in previous years, principally due to their vast wealth of natural
resources, signiﬁcant government reforms and the prospect of peace, stability
and prosperity, they had much to offer certain Portuguese emigrants (Kvamme
2013). There is a demand in these two ex-Portuguese colonies for skilled profes-
sionals within the urban development and architecture sector, the mining and
natural resource extraction industries and the growing medical industries. Most
importantly, the countries share numerous cultural similarities as a result of Por-
tugal’s colonial history. Indeed, some Portuguese emigrants to Angola and
Mozambique may be going back to the country of their birth or that of their par-
ents. Signiﬁcantly, it is not just people who have moved abroad but also Portu-
guese companies trying to avoid the effects of the crisis, as has occurred with
some Irish companies. Estimates for how many Portuguese depart every year for
Angola remain hazy, however. The Observatório da Emigração (2014: 36) con-
tends that approximately 10 per cent of Portuguese emigrants moved to Angola
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(2013) has noted that the vast majority plan to return to Portugal.
Spaniards speak the same language as much of Latin America. Yet, that re-
gion did not experience the same kind of expansion as some of the non-EU
countries mentioned above. Many of the major economic powers in the area,
such as Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, have suffered from various degrees
of social, political and economic uncertainty. Nevertheless, Latin American
countries, such as Ecuador, have attracted considerable numbers of Spanish citi-
zens, but most were actually returnees who acquired Spanish citizenship whilst
working in Spain (INE 2014: 11). Emigration to the United States – another des-
tination of choice in the past for all the countries discussed – has become more
complicated since September 2001 and that country suffered its own economic
problems following the crisis. Consequently, the United States does not feature
too prominently in recent emigration ﬂows from the ‘PIIGS’.
Many Irish migrants, especially in Australia, succeeded in changing their mi-
gration status over time because of their transnational capital. A sizeable propor-
tion of those who ﬁrst arrived on a working holiday visa, for example, managed
to attain long-term skilled visas (known as 457 visas) sponsored by Australian em-
ployers, which put them on the path to acquiring permanent residency. Between
2010/11 and 2013/14, over 55,000 Irish came to Australia on initial temporary
holiday visas. During the same period, over 32,000 Irish entered the four-year
skilled migration scheme. A large number of Irish emigrants were able to transfer
to the skilled scheme because they boasted qualiﬁcations and experience sought
by local employers. In the same period, over 41,000 Italians arrived on working
holiday visas but less than 7000 entered the skilled work permit programme.
Emigration debates in the ‘PIIGS’ have focused largely on the perception that
a ‘brain drain’ is taking place (see, for example, Ortega 2013; Araújo and Ferreira
2013; Labrianidis and Vogiatzis 2013; Tintori and Colucci 2015). No Greek or
Portuguese data exists to test these assertions of a ‘brain drain’. Nevertheless,
Irish, Italian and Spanish ﬁgures do suggest that graduates are overrepresented
among those leaving by approximately twenty-ﬁve per cent in each country
(see Figure 5; cf. OECD 2014: 44–5; see also Recchi 2015: 71). While 49 per cent
of Irish people aged 25–34 in 2014 held a tertiary qualiﬁcation of three years
or more, 62 per cent of recent Irish emigrants from the same age cohort held
the equivalent qualiﬁcation (Glynn, Kelly and Mac Éinrí 2013: 29; see Ryan
in this special section for more details about skilled Irish emigrants in the UK).
Irish emigrants were more likely to hold a tertiary qualiﬁcation than Spanish
and, especially, Italian emigrants. This was also a reﬂection of Ireland’s more
educated young population. Relatedly, a signiﬁcant amount of recent Italian
and Spanish emigrants had not completed their secondary education, whereas
that was the case with only two per cent of Irish emigrants. In some cases, Irish
emigrants had left school after their Junior Certiﬁcates but had then gone on to
complete four-year apprenticeships or various courses that were the equivalent
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Figure 5 Education levels of Italian, Irish and Spanish emigrants (in per cent).
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Irish Journal of Sociology106of upper secondary education or higher, many of which were coveted in Australia,
New Zealand and Canada. Crucially, emigrants felt that their qualiﬁcations
were generally recognised and respected abroad, as reﬂected by their
satisfaction with their jobs (7.6 out of 10), salaries (7.5 out of 10) and career
prospects (8 out of 10), which greatly exceeded their equivalent scores forTable 1: Top-five destinations for Irish, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese
emigrants (2013)
Irish emigrants Italian emigrants Spanish emigrants Portuguese emigrants
1. UK* Germany Ecuador UK
2. Australia UK UK Switzerland
3. Canada Switzerland France France
4. USA France Germany Germany
5. New Zealand United States United States Angola
Sources: CSO and destination data, ISTAT, INE, OEM
*Bold denotes language afﬁnity
Studying Irish emigration 107their previous employment in Ireland (Glynn, Kelly and Mac Éinrí 2013:
66–7).
Of enormous beneﬁt to Irish emigrants moving to their most popular non-EU
destinations was that they spoke the same language, Quebec apart. As Fenoll and
Kuehn (2014) note, speaking the language of the host country ‘eases migrants’ in-
tegration and tends to boost their economic success in the country of destination’.
Most Irish emigrants departed for English-speaking countries. Emigrants from the
‘PIIGS’ did not have the same linguistic advantages in their host states as the Irish
had, as reﬂected in Table 1.
One potential reason for explaining why Irish and Portuguese emigrants moved
in much greater numbers proportionally than the other ‘PIIIGS’ relates to their so-
cial capital. Irish and Portuguese citizens emigrated in greater numbers per capita
in the postwar decades than other ‘PIIGS’ (the 1950s for the Irish and the late
1960s and early 1970s for the Portuguese). Hundreds of thousands of Irish people
again left in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Portugal also experienced its highest
levels of emigration for twenty years in the early 1990s (Peixoto 2007: 453),
whereas Spanish, Italian and Greek emigration remained minimal during this
period.
The unprecedented economic success of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ years led to many
Irish emigrants returning in the late 1990s and 2000s. Sustained economic growth
did not mean that Irish people stopped leaving the country, however; it just meant
that its character changed. Young Irish people started to take up Australian Work-
ing Holiday visas in unprecedented numbers. Most of these people came back to
Ireland, but some invariably remained. These soujourners and stayers established
Irish communities in speciﬁc locations, such as Bondi Junction in Sydney (Collins
2014), which were continually re-greened by regular inﬂows. A similar pattern
emerged in the UK. Despite emigration dropping markedly after the highs of the
late 1980s and early 1990s, Irish people continued to move to the UK in the
1990s and 2000s, especially England (see Walter 2008 and Scully in this special
section). From 2002 to 2008, approximately 10,000 Irish citizens registered for
national insurance numbers in the UK every year (UK Department of Work and
Pensions). Some returned while some consistently remained. As occurred in
Sydney, Irish networks in London, most notably in Clapham, became more prom-
inent (see Ryan in this special section). The importance of Irish networks abroad
is illustrated by the fact that 55 per cent of recent Irish emigrants knew someone
in their destination before leaving. Almost a third drew upon Irish contacts to ﬁnd
accommodation and jobs once there (Glynn, Kelly and Mac Éinrí 2013: 60–1).
The vast majority of those leaving Portugal in the 1990s and 2000s were
‘temporary’ emigrants. In the 1990s, most circulated between Switzerland,
Germany and France before returning home (Peixoto 2007: 456). In the 2000s,
these trends continued but movement between Portugal and neighbouring Spain
became ever more prominent, with over 27,000 moving there in 2007 alone
(OEM 2014). With the large-scale closure of factories in Portugal in the 2000s,
Irish Journal of Sociology108the amount of people migrating to the UK to take up unskilled jobs shunned by
locals also increased (Almeida and Corkill 2010: 76). Since the crisis began, the
UK has increasingly taken Spain’s place as the destination of choice, followed
by Switzerland and Germany (OEM 2014). Portuguese emigrants from the
1980s, 1990s and 2000s strengthened Portuguese communities and networks in
the UK (Almeida and Corkill 2010) and Switzerland (Peixoto 2007), once more,
which presumably aided more recent newcomers. Italian, Greek and Spanish
migrants, by contrast, did not leave in similar numbers in these later decades,
suggesting that emigrants departing since the crisis did not have regenerated net-
works to call upon. Of course, large communities of co-citizens still existed, but
the age-gap between the new and old waves of migration suggests that it did not
have the same dynamic as revitalised Irish and Portuguese networks. Perhaps
the recent rejuvenation of Italian, Spanish and Greek networks in Germany, the
UK and Switzerland will lead to a rise in future chain migration if conditions do
not improve in the ‘PIIGS’.
Signiﬁcantly, 28 per cent of recent Irish emigrants had previous personal ex-
perience of having lived abroad for over one year (Glynn, Kelly and Mac Éinrí
2013: 60). People who re-emigrated were able to draw on their previous experi-
ence abroad. For those who returned to the same location that they had already
lived in, they were able to access earlier established networks. Presumably, this
applied to Portuguese workers and nationalised Spaniards who already had ex-
tensive experience of migration. As Cairns (2014: 43) has argued, the ‘idea of
mobility as inherited capital means that such young people are able to make
quite pragmatic and relatively well-informed choices’. It would be interesting to
explore this hypothesis in more detail in future research.Intra-EU immobility
Due to the inability of citizens from Spain, Greece and Italy to migrate to at-
tractive non-EU destinations, most movement from these countries took place
within the EU, where European regulations promoted acceptance of education
and training qualiﬁcations from other member states. Considering the effects
the crisis had on youth unemployment in these three countries, and the ease of
movement within Europe, it might be expected that large numbers would have
left. Yet the lack of intra-EU migration is striking. Why did more people from
the ‘PIIGS’ not move within the EU?
Unlike in the postwar decades, when northern European countries drastically
required labour, all European countries have suffered – to varying degrees – as a
result of the recent crisis. The crisis hurt many of the traditional destinations that
postwar emigrants from Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain had settled in, such as
the Benelux countries and France. The UK and Germany also felt the effects of
the downturn. In the UK, unemployment went from slightly above ﬁve per cent
in 2008 to over eight per cent by the end of 2011, with almost one million
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Studying Irish emigration 109people losing their jobs in the interim period. Similarly, German unemployment
rose to over eight per cent in late 2008. Switzerland recovered from the crisis be-
fore its EU counterparts and consequently became host to an increasing number
of Spanish, Italian and, in particular, Portuguese emigrants after the recession.
Germany and the UK’s economies have since bounced back from the downturn,
with unemployment levels now reduced considerably. As a consequence, emi-
gration from the ‘PIIGS’ has risen. Yet it still pales in size when set against
intra-EU movement from the newer EU member states. Poland has a population
of less than 40 million, yet it supplied almost as many immigrants to the UK in
2014 as Spain and Italy combined. The German case is even more extreme:
more Poles migrated there in 2013 than from all of the ‘PIIGS’ combined. Simi-
larly, more Romanians moved to Germany in 2013 than Spanish, Italians and
Greeks combined (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014).
Moving to Germany, Scandinavia or the UK may be unattractive for citizens
from southern Europe because the wages they would earn do not make leaving
their family and friends a worthwhile sacriﬁce. Social welfare beneﬁts have im-
proved considerably in the intervening ﬁfty years in most Western European
states. Even in countries that do not have a reliable social welfare system, such
as Italy, families often step in to provide support. Also, migrants from the
‘PIIGS’ might encounter stiff opposition from locals and, more likely, other mi-
grants from non-EU and Eastern European EU migrants if they moved. For
Eastern European EU migrants, the wages they can earn in Western Europe are
still much greater than what they can accrue at home (see Figure 6).
Therefore, it made sense for these people to move. This might help to explain
why Lithuanians and Poles, for example, are still moving in large numbers
Irish Journal of Sociology110within the EU but Italians, Greeks and Spanish are not. Interestingly, out of all
the ‘PIIGS’, Portuguese wages correspond most closely with those of Eastern
European countries, such as Poland, suggesting that the wage differential was
large enough to persuade more Portuguese citizens to leave.
Conclusion
Scholars of Irish emigration have rarely compared Ireland’s experience with
other European countries. This is partly due to language difﬁculties that arise
when trying to examine a number of case studies but it is also a consequence of
an assumption that Irish emigration is exceptional (Lee 1989). By examining
contemporary Irish emigration from a comparative perspective, this paper sought
to discover whether Ireland’s claim of distinctiveness could be veriﬁed in rela-
tion to current emigration. The ﬁndings presented in this paper suggest that
Ireland is markedly different when it comes to recent emigration. The destina-
tions that young Irish people selected and their educational proﬁle appeared to
starkly contrast with that of emigrants from Greece, Italy and Spain. But if
Ireland is not one of the ‘PIIGS’ when it comes to contemporary emigration,
what is it? Some parallels appear to exist with Portugal, but more research is re-
quired to examine this in detail. It is clear that because Ireland shared the same
language and similar education structures as various non-EU states, such as
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, young Irish people had more options to es-
cape the effects of the Great Recession than their southern European counter-
parts. Perhaps comparing Irish emigration with other English-speaking countries
may determine the signiﬁcance of these old British colonial ties further.
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Note
1 The pejorative meaning attached to the term ‘PIIGS’ was clearly demonstrated at
the height of the crisis by various cartoons produced in European newspapers and
magazines showing a picture of pigs eating from the European trough (e.g. The
Sun 2010). The irony is that, as this paper highlights, people in Ireland, Greece,
Spain, Portugal and Italy have suffered more hardship since the start of the eco-
nomic crisis and the subsequent turn to austerity than their Eurozone counterparts.
This is demonstrated, in particular, in the rise in unemployment, especially youth
unemployment, in these countries and the notable decreases in their annual GDPs.
Using the term ‘PIIGS’ is a classic re-appropriation of the term. As Adam Galinsky
et al. (2003: 230) have written, ‘For individuals and groups faced with prejudice,
Studying Irish emigration 111tackling the negative connotations of group labels may be a means of addressing
prejudice itself’. More recently Galinsky et al. (2013: 2020) carried out extensive
empirical research on reappropriation and concluded that ‘self-labelling with a de-
rogatory label can weaken the label’s stigmatizing force’. In addition, ‘PIIGS’ re-
mains an instantly recognisable term for describing the countries in question; a
simple search of Google Scholar shows that the term appeared more than twice as
frequently as the less controversial but also less catchy ‘GIIPS’ in 2014
publications.
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